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Abstract
We test whether household non-durable consumption and in years of schooling are
related, by exploiting a university reform that mostly changes the marginal costs of
educational investment. The empirical results suggest that education is a production
rather than a normal consumption good, producing mainly potential life-time gains.
This finding implies that such reform which achieves its goal, not only positively a↵ects
the individuals’ human capital accumulation process but it also has the unintended
positive e↵ect to moderately boost consumption.
Keywords: Education enrolment; Household consumption preferences.
JEL Codes: I21; I28; D10; D14.
⇤We are grateful to Eliana Baici, Massimiliano Bratti, Rinaldo Brau, Isaac Ehrlich, Marco Francesconi,
Paolo Ghinetti, Emanuela Marrocu, Mario Padula, M. Daniele Paserman, Federico Perali, Luigi Pistaferri,
Martin Zagler and Claudio Zoli and audiences in seminars held at Cagliari, Novara and Verona for valuable
comments. We are fully responsible for any errors.
†Corresponding author: Via Perrone 18, 28100 Novara, Italy; email: daniela.sonedda@uniupo.it
1
1 Introduction
Starting with the seminal papers by Cameron and Heckman (2001), Keane and Wolpin
(2001) and Cameron and Taber (2004), the literature has emphasised the role of household
life cycle, rather than time specific, credit constraint on the human capital accumulation
process of the child (see also Hai and Heckman (2016)). Drawing on this, Carneiro and
Ginja (2016) analyse the e↵ect of permanent and transitory shocks to household income
on the parental investments in children.1 The authors find evidence that household in-
vestments are fully insured against temporary income shocks but only partially insured
against permanent income shocks, albeit the size of the e↵ect is small. An important im-
plication of this analysis, further addressed in Carneiro, Salvanes and Tominey (2016), is
that the educational achievements of the child respond to family income shocks in a similar
manner as (non-durable) consumption. Another implication is that under this setting, the
household (non-durable) consumption and the children’s educational choices are related.
Does household non-durable consumption respond to changes in the years of schooling
of the children? As discussed above, the answer to this question depends on how much
educational and consumption choices are related to family resources but also on household
preferences. As long as education is a production good with potential life-time income
gains, the marginal cost of each commodity is lower for the more educated than for the
less educated and an increase in the years of schooling raises the demand for items with
positive income elasticities (see Grossman (2006) for an extensive review). Michael (1972)
and Michael (1973) test the predictions that schooling might impact positively on luxuries
but negatively on necessities, while there should be no e↵ect on commodities with a unitary
income elasticity. When the analysis is limited to non-durable consumption goods, the
author finds support for this view for 26 out of 35 items.
Lazear (1977)’s paper models education as a joint product, which produces potentially
life-time income gains while providing utility simultaneously. This assumption has one
main implication. It is not clear on a priori grounds the direction of the causality pro-
cess behind the relationship between education and income and, consequently, between
education and consumption. Lazear (1977) finds that education is a costly production
good rather than a normal consumption good. This implies that education a↵ects life-
time income gains of the child (family), and through this mechanism potentially household
consumption.
This paper adds to the literature empirical evidence on the relationship between house-
hold non-durable consumption and children’s years of schooling.
1The authors assess the cognitive stimulation and emotional support children receive using several
measures of parental inputs summarised in an score gathering Home Observation Measurement of the
Environment. However, they show also that changes in parental inputs are correlated to changes in di↵erent
measures (both cognitive and non-cognitive) of child achievement.
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Education might be more closely related to saving rather than consumption since it
is conceived as a multi-period investment whose return is uncertain, despite the ex-ante
commitment of resources and time (Levhari and Weiss (1974)). These uncertain returns
and the non-pecuniary costs of education attendance are both extensively heterogeneous
across individuals. Against this uncertainty, households could at least partially insure their
children through borrowing, saving and labor supply adjustments (Blundell, Pistaferri and
Preston (2008); Low, Meghir and Pistaferri (2010); Heathcote, Storesletten and Violante
(2014)). A similar insurance arrangement can be provided to contain the extent of income
shocks on consumption level (Blundell, Pistaferri and Saporta-Eksten (2016)). As long
as more educated individuals have a lower probability to face income shocks, one could
also argues, however, that precautionary saving could be used instead to insure the lower
educated child. In this framework education can be conceived as an insurance device
that may either complement or substitute precautionary saving (consumption). All in
all, the propensity to insure and the insurance device chosen is likely to be heterogenous
across families in terms of both observable (i.e. children’s age and household income) and
unobservable characteristics (i.e. household preferences, traits and abilities).
All these arguments posit for an endogenous relationship between children’s years of
schooling and household non-durable consumption. In presence of one reform that may
exogenously manipulate the children’s educational choices, it is possible to focus on the
causal mechanism emphasised by Lazear (1977). In this paper, we consider the variability
generated by a reform of the university system which, since 2001, introduced in Italy a
two-tier structure of the university degree (three-year course degree plus an optional two
years course degree) which replaced the previous four year undergraduate programme. We
expect that these institutional changes have modified mainly the marginal opportunity
costs of tertiary education enrolment (Cappellari and Lucifora (2009)) inducing, on av-
erage, an increase of the individuals’ optimal amount of years of schooling. We exploit
such exogenous source of variation in the university structure to estimate the impact that
this reform has had on the decisions to enrol children at higher education and consume,
taken by Italian households during the early 2000s. We use data drawn from the Survey
on Household Income and Wealth, SHIW , database of the Bank of Italy, which permits
to observe family net of taxes incomes, family composition, family background, family
consumption and children’s years of schooling. Our sample consists of 10,877 individuals
aged between 15 and 22 years old in the period 1995-2006 and living in families whose
head aged from 39 to 60 years old. At a given child’s age and household income quintile,
we exploit the variability across cohorts, to study the e↵ects of the university reform on
household decisions of child’s years of schooling and non-durable consumption, by con-
sidering exogenously defined groups exposed to di↵erent rules for obtaining a university
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degree.
Our empirical evidence can be summarised as follows. The university reform raised
the children’s years of schooling, particularly at age above 18. On average, one more year
of education increases non-durable consumption by 0.15 log points. A university reform
that changes the marginal costs of higher education exogenously manipulates the children’s
years of schooling. This exogenous variation raises the potential life-time income of the
child and likely reduces her probability of future idiosyncratic negative income innovations
and through these mechanisms the household (non-durable) consumption increases.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides some economic
background and describes the Italian reform of the university system. The data and the
estimation issues are introduced in Section 3 and 4, respectively. Results are discussed in
Section 5 that precedes our conclusions.
2 Framework
2.1 The setting
Several studies support both theoretically and empirically the argument that education
causes a variety of non-market outcomes among which there is consumption (Grossman
(2006)). The literature is, however, less conclusive on the identification of the mechanisms
through which this result may occur. Whether and the extent to which the educational
choices and family non-durable consumption interact cannot be unambiguously defined
and strictly depends upon the household’s preferences and on how much educational and
consumption choices are related to family resources. For instance, one possible mecha-
nism is the simultaneity of the choice. This requires the children’s years of schooling to
enter directly into the household’s life-time utility function and non-separable preferences
between consumption and education. While these assumptions cannot be excluded from
a theoretical point of view, their validity make impossible to retrieve the parameters of
interest using an identification strategy which di↵ers from a GMM (Generalised Method of
Moments) procedure. In fact, the exclusion restriction hypothesis, which is crucial for the
identification cannot hold in the context of non-separability.
Suppose now that there are N periods. The households evaluates her (random) stream
of consumption c1, c2, ....cN according to the life-time expected utility:
U(c1, c2, ....ct) =
NX
t=0
DtU(Ct)e
⇢Et (1)
where U(Ct) is the current period utility function at time t, Ct is consumption at time t,
D is the discount factor which depends upon the household’s rate of time preference g (i.e.
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D = 11+g ), Et is the post-compulsory child’s years of schooling at time t and ⇢ is a parameter
which can be either positive or negative. In fact, the years of schooling of the children may
a↵ect the household’s instantaneous utility positively (in such a case education is a normal
consumption good) or negatively since education is costly (Lazear (1977)). Equation 1
implies that utility is intertemporally separable and that the instantaneous utility depends
on the family consumption level (per adul equivalent) and on the o↵spring years of schooling
which are normalised to zero if the child is not enroled in post-compulsory education. At
any age t of the child in the range from 15 to 22, the household’s decision problem consists
in maximising the life-time expected utility subject to the life-time budget constraint which
is positively correlated with the children’s years of schooling.
We, therefore start from making a functional form assumption on the instantaneous
utility:
U(ct) = ln(Ct)  ⇢Et (2)
The post-compulsory years of schooling enter into equation 2 in an additive separable
way.2 Although our empirical analysis builds on equation (2) by assumption otherwise we
would not have an exclusion restriction, we will show that such hypothesis is supported by
the data.
In Italy, students holding a high school diploma, which can be academic (licei classici
and licei scientifici) or vocational (istituti tecnici and istituti professionali) can enrol
at any university degree, usually at age 19. At that age, on average, children still live with
their parents independently of their occupational condition. Italy is a country characterised
by ‘ ‘latest (with respect to other countries) late transition to adulthood” of the youth
(Billari and Tabellini (2010); Manacorda and Moretti (2006)). For instance, for men
and women born between 1966 and 1970, on average, education is completed at age 19.2
(men) and 19.3 (women), individuals enter into the labour market at age 21.4 (men) and
24.0 (women) and leave parental home at age 27.2 (men) and 25.1 (women), (Mazzucco,
Mencarini and Rettaroli (2007)). These stylised facts have two important implications
for our analysis. First, the children’s educational choices are taken at the household level.
Second, at the child’s age interval considered, selection bias on co-residentially is negligible,
if exits. Moreover, it is uncorrelated with the educational choice of the household. In our
data, only 3.14% of individuals aged between 18 and 22 is not living with their parents.
Conditioning on the educational status, the percentage of those who are not students and
are not living with their parents corresponds to 5.42%.
Italy is also characterised by the fact that there is a clear socio-economic gradient in
university enrolment: children with low income and/or poorly educated parents are unlikely
to enrol in a university (Checchi, Ichino and Rustichini (1999)). Potential explanations
2The education cost function is not necessarily linear in years of schooling rather it would be convex
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range from unobservable characteristics which can be related to the family background,
such as abilities, preferences and traits, to liquidity constraints. Financial aid for university
students is limited, but public university fees, established on the family financial resources
basis, are moderate and mainly state funded. In Italy, therefore, education finance depends
upon either (both) state transfers or (and) family resources. In fact, Italian households do
not resort to the credit market to invest in education.3
The aim of this section is twofold. We first discuss the role played by the 2001 university
reform, and examine how its introduction a↵ected the children’s years of schooling. Second,
we discuss which parameters can be retrieved in our empirical analysis.
2.2 The University Reform
The main objective of the Bologna declaration, the so called ‘ ‘Bologna process”, signed
by 29 European countries in 1999, was to harmonise the highly fragmented European uni-
versity systems. A similar structure of the university degrees for standards and quality
of qualifications was recognised as a necessary requirement to foster and increase the mo-
bility and employability of tertiary educated individuals across the member states. This
common architecture is built on two main pillars: a two-tier system based on two main
cycles, the bachelor and master degrees, and a unitary credit point system, the European
Credit Transfer and Accumulation System (ECTS). The latter tool let the tertiary edu-
cation systems be comparable across countries by providing a standard mean to measure
the volume of learning and the corresponding workload. In Italy the existing regime was
completely di↵erent and characterised by a binary one tier system. Individuals, who in-
tended to achieve a tertiary education degree, could choose between two distinct paths:
Laurea or University diploma. The former was more academic oriented and its length
depended upon the field of study from four-to-six-year degree programme. It was the main
tertiary education qualification, both at a social and academic level providing access to
public sector careers and specific regulated occupations (e.g lawyers). The nature of the
university diploma was instead vocational since it was required to practise certain occupa-
tions such as for instance the nursing career. It was a shorter degree programme ranging
from two to three years and since its introduction in 1990 has always had a minor role in
the tertiary education choice compared to the more attractive Laurea degree. For instance
in 1998, among the high school graduates only 11% enroled at this type of course (see also
3Law 390/1991 introduced in Italy the so called prestito d’onore. Those eligible to receive an education
subsidy were allowed to borrow at zero interest rate to finance their studies. All in all this policy was
never implemented up to the beginning of the 2000s and only few hundreds of students benefitted from it
between 1997 and 2003. Since then other policy measures were introduced in the attempt to implement the
prestito d’onore and reduce frictions in the credit market related to the demand of credit for educational
purposes. The take-up of such policies was extremely low. Between 2004 and 2011, on average, only 662
students per academic year benefitted of them (i.e. only 0.1% of the student population).
6
Cappellari and Lucifora 2009).
Italy was among the early adopters of the Bologna process in the attempt to face the
weaknesses that the Italian university system experienced. Before the reform, Italy was
characterised by low enrolment rates at tertiary education, the low number of graduates,
the very high drop-out rates, a high fraction of the so-called fuori corso students, individ-
uals who extended their e↵ective duration of academic studies far beyond than the legal
one ending up (in the best scenario) in graduating at high age. To tackle all these issues,
Ministerial Decree No. 509 of 1999, changed deeply the Italian tertiary education insti-
tutional framework. The new regime was fully adopted in the academic year 2001-2002,
simultaneously for all universities. Chiefly, the reform abolished the university diplomas
and splitted the former laurea degree (four/five years course degree) into two levels, an
initial three year degree, called Laurea Breve (i. e. Bachelor Degree), followed by a two
year degree, called Laurea Magistralis (i.e. Master degree). However, the reform allowed
the presence of the so called Lauree a ciclo unico which still consists of a single degree
structure. This is for instance the case of Medicine and Surgeon and Ontology whose
length (i.e six years) has not been changed by the reform.
Ministerial Decree No. 509 of 1999, converted the university diploma courses in bach-
elor degrees and made the tertiary education system to work as follows. Those who choose
to access to tertiary education, enrol into the first degree course, which provides adequate
knowledge of general scientific principles and specific professional skills. Within this new
framework, students can now stop their higher studies after three years, but holding a
degree. The second degree course supplies advanced education and training for highly
qualified professions in specific sectors to those who decide to continue their academic
studies after the bachelor degree.
Additionally, universities gained full autonomy over teaching, including freedom of
freely deciding on curricula, number of exams, and their contents. The common structure
among this heterogeneity in the course degree provided relies on the credit system accord-
ing to which the workload required to pass the exams is precisely quantified, while the old
regime imposed no constraint to it. Universities had to devote time and resources to or-
ganise mandatory orientation sessions providing information on their degree programmes.
The asymmetric information on the educational contents and objectives is therefore re-
duced letting individuals to form more precise expectations on the marginal benefits and
costs of increasing their years of schooling. Moreover, universities were required to estab-
lish placement o ces which provide students internship programmes aiming at increasing
their labour market experience and employability.
We then exploit the variability generated by the introduction of this two-tier structure
of the university degrees to exogenously manipulate the educational choices of those cohorts
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entering in post-compulsory schooling age in year 2001. We construct a university reform
indicator, z1, which takes the value of 1 if the individual is a↵ected by the reform, given age
and cohort of birth. We expect that these institutional changes, especially the introduction
of short degrees and the reduced workload (e.g. smaller number of exams), shrinks the
opportunity costs of tertiary education investment, making the university attendance less
costly. Moreover, this reform could also have modified the returns’ structure of the human
capital accumulation process as long as returns are monotonically increasing in the years
of schooling. This is for instance the case if the reform has altered the returns of a five
(3+2) rather than four year university degrees and of a three year university degree with
respect to a high school diploma. All in all, individuals could have exogenously changed
their optimal amount of years of schooling. To this extent, the reform has potentially
impacted on the years of schooling at all post-compulsory schooling ages. Conditional on
this exogenous manipulation of the household’s educational choice, the family’s permanent
income (the child’s life-time income) unexpectedly changes.
2.3 Parameter retrieved
We expect years of schooling to be positively correlated with the university reform and
potentially have a direct impact on non-durable consumption the extent to which strictly
depends upon by how much households react to exogenous unexpected changes in child’s
life-time income. We study what would happen to household non-durable consumption
decisions if we were to exogenously manipulate the preferred amount of years of educa-
tion. The issue here is to retrieve the average (marginal) treatment e↵ect4 on non-durable
consumption due to a one year change in the amount of education chosen. The source of
identifying variation that is needed to this end is coming through changes in z1, induced
by the university reform which enters the model only through its e↵ect on the years of
schooling (which is the variable that it targets). We let this average treatment e↵ect to
be di↵erent across children’s age and household income quintiles since marginal costs and
benefits of household choices could vary across these two dimensions.
Under these mechanisms, we contribute to the literature by assessing to what extent
investment in education and household consumption are related.
4Proof is provided in the appendix for the simplest case of a linear error structure but could be extended
to the introduction of a more general model using a flexible parametric specification and second order
polynomials under the crucial assumption of additive separable error terms.
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3 Data
3.1 SHIW Data
We make use of 1995-2006 waves of the SHIW to estimate the model. The SHIW is a
nationally representative household survey conducted in Italy every two years5 by the
Bank of Italy, collecting information on a sample of roughly 22,000 individuals and 8,000
households per wave. A great advantage of SHIW is that, in addition to net income and
demographics data, it collects information about household consumption expenditures.
To the best of our knowledge this makes the SHIW the only representative large scale
Italian dataset to include both household net of taxes income, consumption, children’s
education status and family background indicators. The historical database allows us to
consider only broad consumption categories classified as overall consumption, non-durable
consumption goods and durable consumption goods distinguishing among the latter only
the expenditures on vehicles. We, therefore, proxy household consumption choices by the
log of equivalent non-durable consumption expenditures.6 These amounts are equalised
using the square root of household size to account for scale economies within the family
and the monetary values are normalised in terms of 2000 constant prices. Educational
choices are captured by the years of schooling of the children. If a child is still enroled
at school (or university 7) the years of schooling are equal to the di↵erence between the
age and either 6 or 5. In Italy, individuals aged 5 are allowed to enter into the schooling
system although the statutory age is 6. Since we have information on the degree achieved
at the time of the interview, we are able to identify those who started schooling at age 5.
When an individual does not classify herself as student we impute as years of (e↵ective)
schooling those required to achieve the declared degree. For instance, an individual who
declares to have a diploma degree and not to be a student has been imputed 13 years of
schooling (5 years to get a diploma degree which adds to the 3 years of lower secondary
and 5 years of primary school).8
5There is only one exception in year 1998 which follows the 1995 wave.
6Households could adjust the non-durable versus durable consumption choice even if overall consumption
is smoothing. We do not consider durable consumption as an outcome variable to avoid to deal with the
selection process into this choice since not all families consume durable goods. As a robustness check,
instead, we have replicated the analysis using the overall consumption expenditures (i.e. the sum of non-
durable and durable consumption expenditures). These results are robust to our main findings and are
reported in the appendix.
7The data do not provide information on the university attended by children. Students’ mobility,
however, is pretty low in Italy. Moreover, even if students enroled at a university located in a region other
than that of their parental home, they use not to change their residence. In such a case, they are surveyed
by the Bank of Italy within the family.
8We impute an arbitrary value of 3 to the years of schooling of the 20 individuals who have declared to
have any degree.
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3.2 Sample Selection Criteria
Our baseline specification focuses on individuals aged between 15 and 22 years old in the
period 1995-2006 amounting to 11,433 age/individuals observations. In fact, given the
children’s age, we centre our data around 2002, the threshold year when the reform was
implemented and covering an interval of -7, +4 years.9 This selection rule implies that,
given SHIW waves, three cohorts of birth are una↵ected by both reforms and are balanced
out by three a↵ected cohorts. More specifically, all cohorts born before 1980 are not treated
at any age, while all individuals born after 1985 are treated at each age considered. The
cohort of those born in 1982 is the first to be treated by the university reform at the most
relevant age (19 in 2001) to access to an undergraduate degree course. In fact, for marginal
cohorts born between 1982 and 1985, our instrument varies across cohorts given age and
across ages given cohort of birth. The sample selection criteria resembles a regression
discontinuity design structure the extent to which is described by figure 1. As it is clear
from panel (a) of the graph there is not an immediate jump at the threshold cohort at
all ages. At 20 years of age around the threshold cohort there is even a reduction of the
average years of schooling. Nevertheless when averaging across pre and post reform cohorts
the latter have a higher average of the years of schooling at any age even if small at lower
ages (panel b). Here, we are not pursuing a regression discontinuity design identification
strategy but we claim that centering around the threshold year (year of birth) at a given
age allows the instrument to be as good as randomly assigned to contiguous cohorts with
average similar observable characteristics in such a way to balance out covariates at the
mean.
Figure 1: Average years of schooling by age and cohort of birth.
(a) Over cohorts of birth by age (b) Over age by pre and post reform cohorts
Note: The vertical line identifies the last pre-reform cohort.
9For instance, fixing age at 15, we keep individuals born between 1980 and 1991 and we consider the
1987 cohort the first to be a↵ected by the reforms, and so forth.
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Fixing the range of the age of the head of the household is important to make com-
parisons across cohorts be a reliable measures of inequality in living standards, unrelated
to the di↵erent ages at which they are observed and to changes in the age composition of
the population. For this reason, we cut the lower and the upper 5% of the distribution
of the age of the head of the family. Given these data cuts, fixing the children’s age, the
interquartile range of the distribution of the age of the head of the household lies in the
range of 6 to 8 years band. In our data, therefore, children of similar age have parents
of similar age. Finally, we cut the highest and the lowest 1% of the distribution of the
permanent component of income innovations (see sub-section 4) to reduce measurement
errors in their estimates. Our final sample is composed by 10,877 individuals living in
families whose head aged from 39 to 60 years old.
To provide a sense on the randomness of the assignment rule of the university reform,
Table 1 reports the means and standard deviations of the main variables for the full sample
and for the subsample of cohorts who are a↵ected by the reform. The di↵erences between
covariates in the two samples are negligible, suggesting that the selection process into the
reform might be exogenous. In terms of the outcomes of interest, on average, the data
display an increase of children’s schooling attendance and a higher amount of non-durable
consumption for post-reform cohorts.
Figure 2 illustrates the distributions of years of schooling at a given age and income
quintile. The vertical line fixes the potential years of schooling given age if the individual
has started school at the statutory age of 6. All in all, the graphs suggest that a↵ected
cohorts are either as well o↵ or better o↵ than their counterpart una↵ected by the reform in
terms of the educational outcome at the threshold of the potential years of schooling. Those
who complied with the reform are included in the fraction of positive statistical di↵erence in
years of schooling, expressed in percentage terms, between a↵ected and una↵ected cohorts.
Those who were never treated (i.e. they are not accumulating one more year of education)
are those who stopped studying at compulsory schooling age and were a↵ected by the
reform at a higher age or those who lagged behind accumulating an amount of e↵ective
years of schooling smaller than the potential years of schooling given age. They still
lagged behind independently of the reform and dropped out of school as soon as the
binding compulsory schooling age (14 up to 1999, 15 from 1999 to 2004, 16 onwards)
was reached. Those who would have increased their human capital by one more year of
education independently of the reform can be found in the age-income quintile cells where
the percentage of individuals achieving the potential years of schooling given age do not
statistically di↵er across a↵ected and una↵ected cohorts. These individuals can mainly be
found at the highest income quintile and at the lower years of age (15, 16 and 17).
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics.
Overall Sample Sample of those a↵ected
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Years of schooling 11.42 2.49 11.42 2.49
Equivalent nondurable consumption (log) 9.18 0.48 9.18 0.48
Missing income 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.02
University reform 0.39 0.49 0.39 0.49
Gender 0.47 0.50 0.47 0.50
Siblings, (number) 1.22 0.91 1.22 0.91
Hh age 49.09 4.95 49.09 4.95
Hh education, (years) 9.99 4.04 9.99 4.04
Both parents, (dummy) 0.90 0.30 0.90 0.30
Sp education, (years) 8.63 4.77 8.63 4.77
Sp missing education 0.02 0.15 0.02 0.15
Hh missing education 0.03 0.16 0.03 0.16
Permanent component income innovations 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.07
Family educational background, (years) 0.14 2.17 0.14 2.17
Hh missing family background education 0.06 0.23 0.06 0.23
Hh missing family background occupation 0.06 0.25 0.06 0.25
GDP per employee 49.21 6.30 49.21 6.30
Unemployment rate 0.11 0.06 0.11 0.06
Sample Size 10,877 10,877
Sources: SHIW, Bank of Italy, waves 1995-2006; National Institute of Statistics (ISTAT (1995-2006)).
4 Estimation Issues
4.1 The model
All the economic arguments discussed in section 2 posit for the endogeneity of the children’s
years of schooling and household non-durable consumption. This implies that the OLS
estimates of the following model are biased and inconsistent:
y1iah = ↵+  y2iah +  0Xiah +  1Xh +  2Xah +  3(S1h   S¯1) +  4(S2h   S¯2) + u1iah (3)
where the outcome variables at age a for individual i who lives in household h is
composed by two main scalars, the dependent variable y1iah, the household non-durable
consumption, and the endogenous variable y2iah, the children’s years of schooling.
The covariate variables Xiah include observable individual characteristics such as gen-
der, age and year of birth dummies. The linear combination of age and year of birth
dummies controls for time fixed e↵ects. However, we include in Xiah the main economic
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Figure 2: Years of schooling distributions by age and income quintiles.
(a) Fifteen years of age (b) Sixteen years of age (c) Seventeen years of age
(d) Eighteen years of age (e) Nineteen years of age (f) Twenty years of age
(g) Twenty-one years of age (h) Twenty-two years of age
Note: Post reform cohorts are defined as those individuals who reached a fixed age after year 2001 when
Law 509/99 was enforced.
indicators of the region where the individual (family) lives such as the GDP per employee,
the unemployment rate and regional dummies to approximate local market conditions.
We account also for observable characteristics of the household some of which are age-
invariant, Xh, such as the years of schooling of both parents (if the spouse is present
otherwise the years of schooling of the head of the family) and a dummy for missing infor-
mation on family income. Other observable characteristics of the family, Xah, are instead
age-varying and correspond to the number of siblings10, the age and age square of the head
of the household, a dummy for the presence of the spouse and dummies for the household
income quintile. Finally, we control for age invariant household specific e↵ects, S1h and
S2h, which proxy the permanent components of income innovations and the unobservable
characteristics related to the educational family background (see paragraphs 4.3 and 4.4).
Endogeneity of the outcome variables could be controlled for using an instrumental
10In a given year two siblings will have the same non-durable consumption expenditures but di↵erent
age and potentially di↵erent years of schooling.
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variable technique, IV . Under the assumptions that the reform is exogenous and the ex-
clusion restriction holds, the IV method allows to retrieve the unbiased and consistent
estimates of the parameters of interest if they are homogeneous in the population. More-
over, as discussed by several text books (see for instance Wooldridge 2002, Cameron and
Trivedi 2005), under the rather strong hypotheses of homogeneity and linearity in the out-
come equation, monotonicity is imposed by construction. However, section 2 has pointed
to the importance of the heterogeneity in households’ behaviour.
To account for this issue, we consider a structural11 model which allows heterogeneous
e↵ects influencing both the intercept (↵i) and the slope ( i) of the relationship12:
y1iah = ↵¯+  ¯y2iah + ↵i   ↵¯+ ( i    ¯)y2iah +  3(S1h   S¯1) +
 1(S1h   S¯1)y2iah +  4(S2h   S¯2) +  2(S2h   S¯2)y2iah + u1iah (4a)
y2iah = ⇡0 + ⇡Ziah +  1S1h +  2S2h + ⌫2iah (4b)
where the parameter  ¯ denotes the average (marginal) e↵ect of the endogenous variable
on the dependent variable evaluated at each age and income quintile pair. (i.e. the average
(marginal) treatment e↵ect of one more year of schooling di↵ers across ages and income
quintiles.)
This flexible parametric model is estimated using a control function, CF , method.
We exploit four properties of the control function method to achieve identification of the
parameters of interest, (Blundell and Matzkin (2014)). First, the joint distribution of
the reduced form errors terms (⌫1iah, ⌫2iah) is independent of the exogenous instrument.
Second, these independent errors terms enter additively into the reduced form equations.
Third, at the heart of the endogeneity problem there is the correlation between the error
terms in equations (4a) and (4b). Fourth, we exploit the exogenous source of variation
generated by the university reform to have the exclusion restriction. Under the first three
main hypotheses, monotonicity still holds by construction. All these assumptions are con-
sistent with our main hypothesis that children’s years of schooling enter into the household
life-time utility function in additive separable way allowing for the possibility of a recursive
system.
4.2 Exogeneity of the instruments and exclusion restrictions.
The main identification strategy relies on the idea that the e↵ects of interests could be re-
trieved by comparing, at a given age-income quintile pair, cohorts a↵ected by the university
11By structural here we mean that the endogenous variable is included in equation (4a). The reduced
form regression model can be obtained by substituting equation (4b) into (4a).
12For the sake of simplicity we omit to include the covariate terms here.
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reform with those una↵ected. To provide more insights into the exogenous variability of the
instrument, the working sample is now collapsed across cohorts and age. Similar graphs are
also provided after collapsing our data across cohorts, age and household income quintiles.
For each age and year of birth of the child, we distinguish between pre (corresponding
to years 1995-2000) and post reform(s) cohorts (corresponding to years 2002-2006). We
define the latter as those individuals who reached a fixed age after year 2001 when the
university reform was enforced.
Panel (a) of figure 3 shows that centering around the threshold year when law n. 509/99
was implemented randomises quite well the assignment to the reform up to age 20 because
on average the indicator is equal to 0.5. At age 21 and 22 we are not able to perfectly
balance out the number of a↵ected and una↵ected cohorts because not all individuals
belonging to the a↵ected cohorts on the basis of the threshold year are necessarily exposed
to the university reform. This is, for instance, the case of the 1981 cohort who, at the
age of 21, was likely to be already enroled in a graduate programme when the university
reform took place. This is a conservative choice. In fact, for these cohort-age pairs, by
imputing a value of zero to our instrument, in the worst scenario we are underestimating
those exposed to the institutional change (i.e. we have four una↵ected cohorts compared
to two a↵ected cohorts) since these individuals could have requested to switch to the new
system instead of dropping out of university or they could have decided to enrol at the
age of 21 to the bachelor degree instead of stopping at the high school diploma as they
would have done counterfactually in the absence of the reform. If instead they were already
enroled at the old university degree and proceeded in the old system, assigning them the
una↵ected status is correct.
Panel (b) of figure 3 illustrates, as expected, that the randomisation process is indepen-
dent of the income quintile which the household belongs to and supports the assumption
that the university reform generates a randomly assigned exogenous shock to a↵ected in-
dividuals.
The exclusion restriction for identification of the e↵ect of children’s years of schooling
on non-durable consumption requires that the university reform indicator does not have
a direct impact on non-durable consumption. This is surely the case if children’s years
of schooling enter negatively into the household life-time utility function in an additive
separable way and a↵ects non-durable consumption through unexpected changes of the
household’s life-time budget constraint. To support this assumption and interpretation we
add as further controls the household’s idiosyncratic permanent income innovations and a
proxy of unobservable characteristics related to the educational background of the family.
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Figure 3: Age profiles for the university reform.
(a) University reform across cohorts (b) University reform across cohorts and income
quintiles
Note: Post reform cohorts are defined as those individuals who reached a fixed age after year 2001 when
both reforms were enforced.
4.3 Proxying permanent income innovations.
We cannot disregard the role played by the family life-time income in shaping the relation-
ship between household non-durable consumption and children’s years of schooling. To
this end, we adopt a twofold strategy. First, we control for the quintiles of the income
distribution where the households sit. Second, we try to measure idiosyncratic permanent
income innovations.
To stress the role of family background, we are not decomposing income shocks into
permanent and transitory components using GMM as done by Meghir and Pistaferri (2004),
Blundell et al. (2008) and Jappelli and Pistaferri (2011). For example, Carneiro et al.
(2016) estimate the e↵ects of permanent and transitory parental income shocks at age
1   16 on human capital outcomes of Norwegian children. They find that permanent
income shocks have a positive and decreasing in age e↵ect on the children’s educational
achievements. At age 16 these e↵ects approach zero.
Our measure of permanent income innovations is much simpler. It corresponds to
a family fixed e↵ect that captures the household life-time budget constraint. In what
follows, we explain how the permanent component of income innovations are related to
(non-durable) consumption. The inclusion of these shocks allows us to discriminate be-
tween the hypothesis of education as a consumption rather than production good. In fact,
if permanent income innovations have no impact on children’s years of schooling, educa-
tion is a production good. In addition, the degree of the endogeneity between non-durable
consumption and children’s years of schooling draws on the correlation between the error
terms in equations(4a) and (4b). In these error terms enter household preferences, traits
and abilities which our covariates are unable to control for. As long as the permanent
component of the income innovations and a proxy of unobservable characteristics related
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to the family educational background capture part of these preferences, abilities and traits,
they may shape this correlation. For this reason, we include them in the error structure.
As shown in the appendix, however, the key maintained hypothesis to retrieve the average
(marginal) e↵ect of interest is that both the permanent component of the income inno-
vations and our proxy of unobservable characteristics related to the family educational
background are mean independent of the instrument in such a way that the university
reform is as good as randomly assigned.
4.3.1 Consumption and income time series processes.
If people behave according to the permanent income hypothesis, the optimal decision rule is
to vary consumption proportionally (one to one) to permanent unexpected income shocks.
Temporarily low or high incomes may not reflect the long run level of resources available to
a family and may alter the true position of the household in the consumption distribution
when individuals are insured against transitory shocks through borrowing or saving. As a
result, transitory income shocks do not a↵ect consumption if only by their annuity value.
Similar arguments could be applied to the optimal amount of children’s education when
the latter is a normal consumption good.
We attempt at measuring the permanent component of income innovations by assuming
that the common underlying distribution from which the joint time series processes of
consumption and income are drawn, depends upon some unobserved characteristics of
the household related to the family background. As suggested by Jappelli and Pistaferri
(2006), we start by considering a flexible model specification of consumption which builds
on the assumption of a random-walk in the data generation process of the permanent
income component and serially uncorrelated transitory shocks:
lnch,a = lnch,a 1 +  
⇣ + r
1 + r
✏h,a    ✏h,a 1 +  h,a
⌘
(5)
where   measures the extent to which consumption responds to income shocks,   cor-
responds to the excess sensitivity of consumption to current and past income shocks related
to a response to transitory shocks, ✏ denotes transitory shocks and  defines permanent
shocks.
Equation (5) nests the three main consumption models. When households are fully insured
from idiosyncratic shocks the parameter   is equal to zero and consumption is independent
of income shocks. Under the permanent income hypothesis,   is equal to 1 and   is equal
to 0. The latter parameter is positive and equal to 1 in the rule of thumb model according
to which consumption is proportional to income. A value of   between 0 and 1 represents
the extent to which consumption responds to income over and above the amount warranted
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by the permanent income hypothesis.13 Equation (5) amounts to saying that at any age
(log of equivalent) consumption is given by past consumption level plus permanent and
transitory income innovations. By recursive substitution, we obtain:
lnch,a =  
aX
t=1
 h,t +  
⇣ + r
1 + r
✏h,a    a t✏h,a 1
⌘
(6)
Averaging across ages a, under the assumptions that a is su ciently large and   is
equal to zero, we obtain the following expression for consumption:
lnch,a
a
=  
Pa
t=1 h,t
a
(7)
Equation (7) states that the consumption level is given by the sum of innovations in
permanent income from the beginning of working life to the current age while the transitory
component vanishes out even if it is not i.i.d but serially correlated. We aim at finding an
empirical counterpart of
Pa
t=1 h,t
a .
4.3.2 Household unobserved heterogeneity, family background and perma-
nent income innovations.
The framework. Jappelli and Pistaferri (2006)’s empirical findings show that di↵erent
population groups are systematically exposed to di↵erent idiosyncratic shocks facing con-
sequently di↵erent income processes. They find that the estimated variance signal that the
less educated face a higher variance of permanent income shocks, a pattern also uncovered
by Carroll and Samwick (1997) with US data. Drawing on this evidence, we assume that
the consumption process is described by equation (5) and family incomes are randomly as-
signed by the lottery of birth which accordingly distributes abilities and parenting. There
are two channels through which the family background impacts on the income process of
the household: first, the direct e↵ect (i.e. identified across family background groups) of
providing the environment where the child grows up (inherited abilities and networks) and
second, an indirect e↵ect (i.e. identified within the family background group), contribut-
ing to the development of the innate abilities, preferences and traits which determine the
position in the distribution of income conditional on the family background.
13Jappelli and Pistaferri (2006) interpret this parameter as the probability that a household consumes
all her income as a consequence of binding liquidity constraints or hyperbolic discounting.
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Proxying permanent income innovations. We use SHIW data which provide infor-
mation on the education and socio-economic position of the grandparents.14 After cutting
the lowest and the highest 5% of the age of the head of the household distribution, we
retain all 69,740 individuals in the full dataset.
We draw on the assumption that assortative mating shapes children’s abilities, traits
and preferences. For each year of the survey, we start by partitioning the observed families
into two groups according to the grandfather’s occupational background: one, the low
skilled, gathering the grandfathers who were unemployed or employed either in agriculture
or as an unskilled manual worker and the other, the skilled, comprising all the other
cases. Starting from this broad classification, we define three family background groups.
The low skilled background group includes all the families for which the fathers of both
spouses were low skilled. Symmetrically, the skilled group refers to all the families where
both grandfathers were skilled. Residually, we define a third group comprising all families
with a grandfather belonging to the skilled category and the other one to the unskilled
group. Since missing data on family background indicators are likely to be related to
unobservable characteristics of the household, we keep observations with missing values
for the occupational conditions of the grandfathers assigning the family to the mixed
background group.
For each of these three groups and for each year of the survey, we rank households
within each group according to their (log) net of taxes income, income hereafter,15 and (log)
consumption. As long as the rank position within the group specific income (consumption)
distribution depends upon the household’s decisions, the properties of the distribution
itself (such as the percentiles, the median, the mean, and variance) are exogenous to the
family’s choice. Our key maintained hypothesis, therefore, is that the rank position (the
percentile) identifies the set gathering all families with similar unobservable characteristics
(i.e abilities, traits, preferences).16 We, then, compare the income (consumption) of a
family at a given rank (percentile) of the group specific income (consumption) distribution
with the income (consumption) that this family would have reached if the backgrounds
of origin were equalised across all families. This counterfactual income (consumption)
corresponds to the weighted average income (consumption), µ, at a given percentile p of
the full sample distribution Fj(·) of either income or consumption, given the weight wj of
group j.
The empirical counterpart of the vertical distance between the family background spe-
14The questionnaire of the survey reports this questions: ”What were the educational qualifications,
employment status and sector of activity of your parents when they were your present age? (If the parent
was retired or deceased at that age, refer to time preceding retirement or death).”
15Net of taxes income is equalised using the square root of household size.
16We are aware that we are not identifying all the household unobservable characteristics but only those
related to the occupational condition of the grandfathers given our choices on groups’ classification.
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Figure 4: Income distributions across family background groups
Note: Our elaboration using SHIW, Bank of Italy, wave 2002.
cific quantile functions F 1j (p) and the weighted average quantile function can be proxied
by the estimated residuals "Y of the following regression model, described for expositional
purposes in terms of income Y :
Y =
100X
p=1
 j · 1 [Y 2 P (pj)] + "Y , (8)
where 1[·] is an indicator function for the condition expressed in its argument to be
satisfied. This indicator function is empirically captured by sets of dummies which take the
value of 1 in correspondence of the rank occupied by the household in her group specific
income Y (consumption C) distribution. A dummy variable that controls for missing
information on the background of origin is also included into equation (8).
As illustrated by figure 4, the residuals "Y correspond to the vertical distance be-
tween the estimated reference income (solid line) and the family background group specific
income distributions for a given percentile (i.e. for instance the 85th) in a given year
(i.e. 2002). When these residuals are statistically equal to zero for each percentile of the
income (consumption) distribution, we argue that the family background group specific
distributions are identical meaning that the grandparental backgrounds have no impact on
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families’ unobservable characteristics and on families’ s idiosyncratic shocks.
In fact, for a given year these residuals "Y reflect both household idiosyncratic shocks
and household unobservable characteristics related to the family background. To separate
the influence of the family background from such residuals, we follow the procedure sug-
gested by Bjo¨rklund, Ja¨ntti and Roemer (2012) adding and subtracting to the residuals "Y
an innovation term uY which corresponds to the residuals "Y normalised by the fraction
of overall variation explained by the family background group specific variation.
Y =
100X
p=1
 j · 1 [Y 2 P (pj)] + ˜"jY + uY , (9)
where k =
⇣
1P
j  
2
j
⌘  12
= 1  ; uY =
"Y
k Y
and
˜
"jY = "Y   "Yk j .
The term
˜
"jY hence captures both the direct and the indirect contributions of the
family background to the income (consumption) innovation in a given year by capturing
the influence of family background on the conditional variation of income (consumption)
around the expected value for each group. The idiosyncratic innovation uY has, instead,
a common variance 1k2 =  
2 across all family background groups.
This decomposition can be obtained starting from the OLS residuals "Y in (8) and
then calculating the family background group specific variances  2j . In the case of very few
observations for some groups and/or very small estimated variances (leading to very large
standardised residuals uY ) we follow what suggested by Bjo¨rklund et al. (2012) and we
regress the estimated variances on the background characteristics and use the fitted values
from that regression as the basis for "Yk j .
For each year and for both consumption and income processes, we sum the innovations
uY available for each household up to that time point. Since the sum of innovations depends
upon individual’s labour history, this sum is divided by the household potential working
age which is an average of the potential working age (age minus 15, the legal age to enter
into the labour market) of all adults in the family. The resulting sum of innovations is then
averaged across time (age) to retrieve the permanent component of both consumption and
income processes.
Figure 8 presents suggestive evidence on the di↵erence between the distributions of
permanent income and consumption innovations. Since these di↵erences are small, we
include into the regression models our measure of the permanent income innovations as
the empirical counterpart of
Pa
t=1 h,t
a .
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Figure 5: Di↵erences between the consumption and income innovation distributions
(a) 1995 (b) 1998 (c) 2000
(d) 2002 (e) 2004 (f) 2006
Note: Our elaboration using SHIW, Bank of Italy, waves 1995-2006.
4.4 Unobservable characteristics related to the educational background
of the family.
The low enrolment rate at university of individuals coming from low income families and/or
poorly educated parents explains the strong intergenerational correlation in educational
attainment in Italy (Hanushek and Wo¨ßmann (2006); Checchi and Flabbi (2013)). We at-
tempt at controlling for household unobservable characteristics related to the educational
background of the family. In fact, more educated parents are likely to be more e↵ective in
encouraging traits and preferences in their children which may impact on their marginal
costs and benefits of schooling (for instance by training the child in how to learn). More-
over, even for a given level of education, these preferences and traits might have a direct
impact on the household consumption. They can be associated to abilities which, inde-
pendently of education, will a↵ect the life-time income of the o↵spring and through this
may impact on consumption. They can also be related to either (both) time preferences
or (and) the risk attitude of the household which a↵ect the family’s (non-durable) con-
sumption decision. Finally we allow this measure of unobservable characteristics related
to the family educational background to a↵ect directly children’s years of schooling and
consumption but to shape also the correlation between the error terms in equations (4a)
and (4b) under the assumption of mean independence from the instrument.
We classify households into groups according to the years of schooling of the grandpar-
ents. The low (high) educated background group includes all households for which both
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spouses’ parents had on average either less (more) than 5 years of education. The mixed
(third) group has the parents of one spouse belonging to the low educated category and
the others to the high educated one. We assign to this group also families with missing
information on the educational level of the grandparents. In fact, we keep observations
with missing values and we control for the potential correlation between these values and
unobservable characteristics of the household using a dummy variable taking the value of
one in case of missing information.
We rank households within each group according to the average years of schooling of
the parents (if the spouse is present, otherwise we consider the years of schooling of the
head of the family). We consider deciles to identify the rank position in the parents’ years
of schooling distribution. We regress the average years of schooling of the parents on dum-
mies capturing the rank position into the group specific (i.e. low, high, mixed educated
grandparents) years of schooling distribution and a dummy variable controlling for the
missing values. We interpret the residuals of such regression as a fixed component of the
household unobservable characteristics related to the educational background of origin.
To clarify the concept, families with positive residuals are those which have unobservable
characteristics (such as abilities, traits or preferences) that have provided them an advan-
tage in the years of schooling chosen by the parents with respect to the other households
experiencing di↵erent family background but sitting in the same decile of the years of
schooling distribution. There are no di↵erences in families’ abilities (traits, preferences)
generated by the average educational level of the grandparents when the corresponding
residuals are statistically equal to zero for each decile of the parents’ years of schooling
distribution in such a way that the distributions of the three groups are identical.
5 Empirical Analysis
5.1 First stage regression: years of schooling
The first stage regression model consists in estimating equation (4b) allowing the e↵ect of
interest to be specific for each age-income quintile pair. We consider a second order poly-
nomial in income quintiles and age for the instrument, the unobservable characteristics
related to the educational family background and the permanent component of income in-
novations. This flexible parametrisation results from testing the equality of the coe cients
of interest across the age and income quintile dimensions in the structural model equation.
To this end the error structure which allows to estimate the average (marginal) e↵ect of
years of schooling on non-durable consumption has been be varied accordingly with re-
spect to the simplest linear model underlined by equations 4a and 4b. There are two main
advantages in adopting this flexible model specification. First, it imposes no restrictions
23
Figure 6: First stage regression model: years of schooling
(a) University reform (b) Permanent component of in-
come innovations
(c) Unobservable characteristics
related to the educational family
background
Note: Marginal e↵ect of a one unit change in the university reform, the unobservable characteristics related
to the family educational background and the permanent component of income innovations. These marginal
e↵ects are estimated using a flexible parametric model specification across age and income quintiles. We
include as further regressors individual’s and household’s characteristics, local market conditions proxied
by regional variables, income quintile, age and year of birth dummies. Bootstrapped standard errors and
confidence bands at 95% level.
on the underlying conditional mean without altering the identification assumption that
the estimated average (marginal) e↵ects of interest is driven by the exogenous variabil-
ity in the expected value of non-durable consumption given years of schooling (and other
covariates) generated by the university reform. Second, it sheds light on the age-income
quintile cells which complied and which did not. We cluster standard errors by a household
indicator since we assume independence over families but we allow for serial correlation
within families. In fact, the university indicator equals a string of zeroes followed by a
string of ones at the children’s age that switches from never being a↵ected to forever after
being a↵ected by the educational policy in place.17 All standard errors are bootstrapped
given the presence of generated regressors.
Panel (a) of figure 6 shows that there are di↵erences across age and income quintile cells
on the e↵ectiveness of the reform. Compliers should be found in the lower income quintiles
at ages higher than 18 while the always takers might sit at the higher income quintiles.
At the lowest income quintile where the impact is stronger, the university reform raised
the children’s years of schooling from 0.25 to 0.50 years. It is, instead, not statistically
significant at the highest income quintiles.18
The impact of the permanent components of income innovations on the children’s
years of schooling (panel (b)) is not statistically significant. (In very few age-income
cell is statically di↵erent from zero but negative.) This finding excludes the possibility
17As a sensitivity check we have also clustered standard errors by a household indicator and the children’s
cohort of birth, where the latter contribute to define the level of variability of the instruments. Results are
robust and are available upon request from the authors.
18The F-test on the statistical insignificance of the instrument rejects the null hypothesis (13.23).
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that education is a normal consumption good otherwise the coe cients would be positive
and statistically significant. Our empirical evidence, therefore, is consistent with Lazear
(1977)’s main conclusions, education is a production rather than a consumption good
producing mainly potential life-time income gains. Moreover, education is costly implying
that the amount of children’s years of schooling chosen is lower than the wealth-maximising
level because of the costs associated to it, including the opportunity costs measured by
the foregone wage. We believe, therefore, that this evidence supports our assumption that
children’s years of schooling enter (negatively) in the household life-time utility function
in an additive separable way.
The e↵ect of the unobservable characteristics related to the educational family back-
ground (panel (c)) is precisely estimated and varies across both the age and income quintile
dimensions. One standard deviation increase of the years of education of the grandparents
changes the years of schooling of the grandchild in a range of  0.06, at age 15, and 0.29
years, at age 22, in the lowest income quintile and from  0.21, at age 15, to 0.14, at age
22, in the highest income quintile. This implies that growing-up in a household whom
grandparents have a higher educational level changes the marginal costs and benefits of
schooling of the grandchild in terms of enroling at university at lower income quintiles and
in terms of the probability to complete the university degree course for all income quintiles.
Put it di↵erently, having an advantage in terms of years of schooling of the grandparents
has a positive e↵ect on the years of schooling of the grandchild when the expected marginal
net returns are higher further suggesting that education is costly. At the lowest income
quintile, where recovering to pre-cautionary savings against income shocks is limited, the
educational family background e↵ect is either statistically equal to zero (at ages 15 and 16)
or positive. Since years of schooling are a costly production good which a↵ect the life-time
budget constraint, the educational family background transfers traits, skills or preferences
which altogether contribute to increase the future employability (and the future wage) of
the o↵spring and make education an insurance device against future income shocks.
5.2 Main regressions
Marginal e↵ects of children’s years of schooling on non-durable consumption.
Figure 7 provides empirical evidence on whether and to what extent household non-durable
consumption responds to changes in the years of schooling of the children. As a benchmark
we consider the OLS estimates, reported in panel (a). Endogeneity of the years of schooling
is accounted for by the IV estimator, panel (b) and the CF estimator, panel (c), which
is our method of reference. Under this latter setting, the degree of the endogeneity of the
model depends upon the correlation in the error terms of the equations (4b) and (4a).
We assume a linear relationship between the two error terms and a flexible parametric
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Figure 7: Marginal e↵ects of years of schooling on non-durable consumption
(a) OLS (b) IV
(c) CF (d) Comparison across coe cients
Note: Marginal e↵ect of one more year of children’s schooling on household non-durable consumption.
These marginal e↵ects are estimated using a flexible parametric model specification across age and income
quintiles. We include as further regressors individual’s and household’s characteristics, local market condi-
tions proxied by regional variables, income quintile, age and year of birth dummies. Bootstrapped standard
errors and confidence bands at 95% level.
specification across age and income quintiles (second order polynomial) for the interaction
between these error terms and the endogenous variable. We introduce in the error structure
also the permanent component of income innovations and the unobservable characteristics
related to the family educational background using a second order polynomial in age and
income quintiles.19
All the estimators retrieve a positive, statistically significant, marginal e↵ect of years
of schooling on non-durable consumption. Panel (d) of figure 7 compares the coe cients
estimated using OLS, IV and CF and reveals a downward bias of the OLS and IV
estimates up to age 18 with respect to the parameter retrieved by CF . At ages higher
than 18, IV estimates are, instead, upward biased. The size of the e↵ect di↵ers across
the estimation procedures ranging from 0.03 at age 15 to 0.02 at age 22 (OLS), from
19We have also tried other functional form specifications of the error structure. The one chosen balances
out the trade-o↵ between flexibility and parsimoniousness in the specification and it is the most accepted by
data in terms of the statistical tests on the equality of the coe cients. Results are, however, qualitatively
robust to changes in the error structure specification.
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0.14 at age 15 to 0.16 at age 22 (IV ), and from 0.14 at age 15 to 0.16 at age 22 (CF ).
The correlation between years of schooling and the error term, in the OLS non-durable
consumption equation, is negative. One possible interpretation is that those families who
have higher preference for today consumption are less future oriented and could opt out for
a lower level of education. This time preferences can be correlated to the child’s abilities
which a↵ect the marginal costs and benefits of schooling. In fact, since the correlation
between the university reform and years of schooling is positive (panel (a) of figure 6),
the upward bias in the IV coe cient with respect to CF at age higher than 18 implies
a positive correlation between the university reform and the error term in the reduced
form regression model estimated under the assumption of homogenous coe cients of the
endogenous variable. This suggests a positive selection process into university enrolment
related to the presence of heterogenous expected gains which are not controlled for by the
IV method. To get some insights on the importance of the endogeneity bias, we average out
the coe cients across age and income quintiles, and we then calculate the ratio between the
CF and OLS estimates and between the CF and IV estimates. The former ratio amounts
to 7.86 while the latter corresponds to 0.98. Both ratios are statistically significant. This
indicates that the bias of IV is very small and negligible but the degree of endogeneity is
strong given the large downward bias of the OLS.
6 Conclusions
This paper presents empirical evidence on whether and to what extent household non-
durable consumption responds to changes in the years of schooling of the children. The
introduction in 2001 of a two-tier structure of the university degree programme provided
us the exogenous source of variation required to evaluate that, on average, one more year
of education increases non-durable consumption by 0.15 log points. Our findings are con-
sistent with Lazear (1977)’s main conclusions. Education is a production rather than a
normal consumption good producing mainly potential life-time income gains. Moreover,
education is costly, entering on net negatively into the life-time utility function implying
that the amount of children’s years of schooling chosen is lower than the wealth-maximising
level because of the costs associated to it. A university reform that changes mostly the
marginal costs of higher education exogenously manipulates the children’s years of school-
ing. This exogenous variation raises the potential life-time income of the child and likely
reduces her probability of future idiosyncratic negative income innovations and through
these mechanisms increases the household (non-durable) consumption choice. Our results
have important policy implications. An exogenous shock in the o↵spring’s years of school-
ing raises overall non-durable consumption instead of exclusively a↵ecting the composition
of the consumption bundle. This implies that a reform of the education system which
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achieves its goal, not only a↵ects positively the individuals’ human capital accumulation
process but it also has the unintended positive e↵ect to moderately boost consumption.
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A Additional tables and figures
Figure 8: Di↵erences between the consumption and income innovation distributions
(a) 1995 (b) 1998 (c) 2000
(d) 2002 (e) 2004 (f) 2006
Note: Our elaboration using SHIW, Bank of Italy, waves 1995-2006. For each year and for both income
and consumption innovations, the transitory component of the innovations are calculated as the di↵erence
between our measure of permanent shocks and the yearly innovations.
31
Figure 9: Marginal e↵ects of years of schooling on consumption
(a) OLS (b) IV
(c) CF (d) Comparison across coe cients
Note: Marginal e↵ect of one more year of children’s schooling on household consumption. These marginal
e↵ects are estimated using a flexible parametric model specification across age and income quintiles. We
include as further regressors individual’s and household’s characteristics, local market conditions proxied
by regional variables, income quintile, age and year of birth dummies. Bootstrapped standard errors and
confidence bands at 95% level.
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Table 2: Non-durable consumption equation: covariates
OLS IV CF
Gender 0.001 -0.053** -0.049**
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
Siblings, (number) -0.038*** -0.011 -0.012
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
Hh education, (years) 0.013*** -0.006 -0.004
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
Sp education, (years) 0.009*** -0.003 -0.002
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Both parents, (dummy) -0.039* 0.006 0.002
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03)
Hh age 0.028** 0.024* 0.022*
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Hh age squared -0.000** -0.000* -0.000*
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
GDP per employee -0.007** -0.002 -0.003
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Unemployment rate -0.733*** -1.004*** -0.991***
(0.25) (0.32) (0.31)
Note: We include as further regressors income quintile, age and year of birth dummies.
Table 3: Consumption equation: covariates
OLS IV CF
Gender -0.009 -0.074*** -0.068**
(0.01) (0.03) (0.03)
Siblings, (number) -0.035*** -0.001 -0.004
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Hh education, (years) 0.013*** -0.010 -0.007
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
Sp education, (years) 0.007*** -0.007 -0.005
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
Both parents, (dummy) -0.017 0.040 0.033
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03)
Hh age 0.020 0.014 0.013
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
Hh age squared -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
GDP per employee -0.003 0.003 0.002
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Unemployment rate -0.588** -0.934** -0.909**
(0.29) (0.39) (0.37)
Note: We include as further regressors income quintile, age and year of birth dummies.
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